Consequently, the figuration of humanity found in the tradition of the oppressed represents a series of distinct assemblages of what it means to be human in the modern world. The particular assemblage of humanity under purview here is habeas viscus, which, in contrast to bare life, insists on the importance of minuscule movements, glimmers of hope, scraps of food, the interrupted dreams of freedom found in those spaces deemed devoid of full human life (Guantanamo Bay, internment camps, maximum security prisons, Indian reservations, concentration camps, slave plantations, or colonial outposts, for instance). Beyond the dominion of the law, biopolitics, and bare life they represent alternative critical, political, and poetic assemblages that are often hushed in these debates. Habeas viscus accents how race becomes pinioned to human physiology, exposing how the politicization of the biological always already represents a racializing assemblage. Taking leave from considering racial categorization as a mere ideological imposition of scientifically "wrong" phenomena, habeas viscus, as an idea, networks bodies, forces, velocities, intensities, institutions, interests, ideologies, and desires in racializing assemblages, which are simultaneously territorializing and deterritorializing.
Habeas viscus suggests a technological assemblage of humanity, technology inscribed here in the broadest sense as the application of knowledge to the practical aims of human life or to changing and manipulating the human environment.
Though this is barely hinted on the surface of the text, we might say that Brent, between the lines of her narrative, demarcates a sexuality that is neuter-bound, inasmuch as it represents an open vulnerability to a gigantic sexualized repertoire that may be alternately expressed as male/female. Since the gendered female exists for the male, we might suggest that the ungendered female- in an amazing stroke of pansexual potential- might be invaded/raided by another woman or man.
Whether or not the captive female and/or her sexual oppressor derived “pleasure” from their seductions and couplings is not a question we can politely ask. Whether or not “pleasure”is possible at all under conditions that I would aver as non-freedom for both or either of the parties has not been settled. Indeed, we could go so far as to entertain the very real possibility that “sexuality,”as a term of implied relationship and desire, is dubiously appropriate, manageable, or accurate to any of the familial arrangements under a system of enslavement, from the master’s family to the captive enclave. Under these arrangements,the customary lexis of sexuality, including “reproduction,”“motherhood,” “pleasure,”and “desire”are thrown into unrelieved crisis.